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INTERNET MONITORING OF FEDERAL JUDGES:
STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN
INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
I. INTRODUCTION

Here's an everyday story: another group of employees discovers that
they are being monitored at work for signs of... downloading music,
watching streaming video and hunting pornography. They rebel,
insisting that their bosses turn off the monitoring software or they will
go to court for violation of privacy. That would be a short trip, because
these complainants are themselves senior judges of the United States
Court of Appeals.
It has been debated and resolved that private employers are
permitted to monitor the Internet use2 of their employees. The current
controversy surrounds the manner in which federal judges' Internet use
is to be monitored, if at all. Judges oppose being monitored and claim
that it violates the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
("ECPA"),3 which makes it illegal to intercept any "wire or electronic
communication" without notice.4
This note explores the Internet use policies recommended by the
Committee on Automation and Technology of the Judiciary Conference
of the United States ("CAT"), and later adopted by the Judicial
Conference of the United States ("Judicial Conference"). Part II
examines the recommendations ("Initial Policy") proposed by CAT and
judges' opposition to this policy. Part III discusses the revised proposal
("Adopted Policy") that was subsequently adopted on an interim basis.
Part IV analyzes the Adopted Policy's advantages and disadvantages.
More specifically, Part IV addresses the factors of judicial
1. Danny O'Brien, Your Right to Chat, TIMES NEWSPAPERS LIMITED, Sept. 9, 2001, at
Doors 30.
2. For the purposes of this note, Internet use includes the use of electronic mail ("e-mail").
3. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.). For a discussion of the judges' opposition, see infra Part II.F.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000).
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independence, judicial accountability and judicial security, which should
be considered in adopting any policy that monitors judges. Part V
examines possible resolutions to the Adopted Policy, including
alternative measures necessary to provide sufficient notice and consent
to the Adopted Policy.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE ADOPTED POLICY
The Administrative Office of the Courts ("AO") implements
policies created by the Judicial Conference, such as appropriate Internet
use policies Prior to the adoption of an Internet use policy, judges held
that employees had no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their
Internet use. 6 The CAT recommended the Initial Policy, which provided
including
for the monitoring of Internet use, of all judiciary employees,
8
judges.7 Judges have publicly disfavored this Initial Policy.
A. Judicial Conference of the United States
The Judicial Conference is the body that initiates policies for the
federal court system.9 Created by Congress in 1922,"° the Judicial
Conference has the "ultimate authority over the internal operation of the
federal courts. . . ."" The Chief Justice of the United States Supreme

Court is the presiding officer of the Judicial Conference. 2 The chief
judges from the thirteen courts of appeals, a district judge from each of
the twelve circuits and the chief judge of the Court of International
Trade constitute the members of the Judicial Conference.'3 The Judicial
Conference meets biannually to discuss administrative and policy issues

5. Judicial Conference of the United States, at http://www.uscourts.gov/judconf.html (last
visited Dec. 22, 2002); Administrative Office of the United States Courts, at
http://www.uscourts.gov/adminoff.html (last visited Dec.22, 2002). For a discussion of the history
of the judicial administrative system, see infra Part IV.C.
6. See infra Part lI.B.
7. News Release, Administrative Office of the U.S Courts, Federal Judges Issue Intemet Use
Policy for U.S. Courts (Aug. 13, 2001), at http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/draft3.pdf
[hereinafter Initial Policy].
8. See infra Part II.F.
9. Judicial Conference of the United States, supra note 5.
10. Id.
11. Jeffrey Rosen, Who's Spying on Judges (Sept. 4, 2001),
http://www.tnr.com/091001/rosen091001.html.
12. Initial Policy, supra note 7.
13. Id.
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with respect to the court system. 4 Additionally, it makes
recommendations to Congress regarding legislative aspects of the
Judiciary.' 5
As one of its duties, the Judicial Conference must submit
suggestions to the various courts in the "interest of promoting uniformity
of management procedures and the expeditious conduct of court
business .... ,,6 The Judicial Conference also supervises the Director of
the AO, who in turn functions as the administrative officer of the
courts.' 7 The Director's duties include "supervis[ing] all administrative
matters relating to the offices of the clerks and other clerical and
administrative personnel of the courts .... 18
B. How Judges Viewed Issues of Privacy Before the Initial Policy
Employers are concerned that they may be subject to civil or
criminal liability as a result of employee misuse of the Internet. 9
Employers prefer to diminish the possibility of potential abuse by
occasionally monitoring employees' use of the Internet 0 Furthermore,
upon termination of employment, employers have access to the
employee's e-mail account and can respond to e-mail that continues to
arrive."
In Smyth v. Pillsbury Co.,22 a federal district court dismissed an
invasion of privacy case by an employee who was fired for statements he
made in an e-mail to his supervisor. 23 The court held that even though
employers assured e-mail would remain privileged and confidential,
employees still had no reasonable expectation of privacy. 24 The court
reasoned that once an employee communicates to a third party over an e-

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Judicial Conference of the United States, supra note 5.
17. Id.
18.
JUDICIAL

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ADDENDUM TO THE REPORT OF THE
CONFERENCE COMMITrEE ON

AUTOMATION AND TECHNOLOGY

http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/jccsumreport.pdf

[hereinafter

6 (Sept. 2001) at

ADDENDUM

TO

INITIAL

POLICY].

19. Alex Modelski, Email and the Law of Privacy (2001), at
http://www.iplaw-bellevue.com./custom/article_7.htm. Some misuses include importation of viruses,
trade secrets, transmission of pornography, defamatory and discriminatory statements. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
23. Id.
at 101.
24. Id.
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mail system, which is used by the entire company, reasonable
expectations of privacy disappear.25 Since judges are struggling to
preserve their own privacy in the workplace, decisions like Smyth may
become rare.26
In Bourke v. Nissan Motor Corp., the employer randomly
accessed one of its employee's e-mail messages that contained personal
and sexual statements.28 The employee sued the employer for invasion of
privacy and for violating the ECPA. 29 The court held that employees had
no reasonable expectation of privacy in using e-mail because all
employees had signed waivers.3 ° The waivers stated that employees must
limit the use of company computers to business-related matters. 3'
In addition, courts have found that public employees lack a
reasonable expectation of privacy.32 In United States v. Simons,33 a
government employee was charged with violating federal laws against
child pornography after pornographic materials were found on the
employee's computer.34 The court held that government employees do
not have a reasonable expectation of priacy with respect to information
stored in their computers at work. 5
C. Recommendations Initiated by the Committee on
Automation and Technology
The CAT recommended that the Judicial Conference consider the
following proposals.36 First, allow for the decentralization of Internet

25. Id.
26. Philip Gordon, Judge Leads Fightfor Workplace Privacy, DENY. POST, Sept. 20, 2001, at
B-07.
27. No. B068705 (Cal. Ct. App. July 26, 1993).
28. Modelski, supra note 19.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000).
34. Id. at 395.
35. Id. at 398; see also Wasson v. Sonoma County Junior Coll., 4 F. Supp. 2d 893 (N.D. Cal.
1997) (holding that a policy giving the public employer the right to access all information stored on
its computer defeats an employee's reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Monroe, 52
M.J. 326 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (opining that an Air Force sergeant does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his workplace e-mail account because e-mail was used only for official
business and because the network banner notified each employee upon logging on that the use of the
e-mail was subject to monitoring).
36. Initial Policy, supra note 7.
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access from a national level to individual courts.37 Such decentralization
would give each court considerable autonomy in accordance with
policies and guidelines set at the national level.38 Second, permit a unit
39
of the AO to control the inappropriate use of government resources.
Third, give individual courts the responsibility of enforcing appropriate
policies.4 0 Fourth, require the AO to distribute the proposals, approved
by the Judicial Conference, to all judicial branch employees requesting
each court to display an on-screen banner notice.' Prior to accessing the
Internet, each court would be disclosing that the use of the computer
system is subject to the interim policy, 42 and that its contents may be
viewed and recorded.43 The banner notice will explicitly state that the
employee's use of the system constitutes consent to viewing and
recording, and that uses inconsistent with the policy may result in
disciplinary action." Finally, direct the AO to take appropriate steps to
block traffic from Internet services such as Napster, 5 Glacier 6 and
Quake, 7 involving computers connected to the Data Communications

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Initial Policy, supra note 7.
42. Id. The interim policy is the model policy adopted by the executive branch and revised by
the CAT. Id. The CAT tailored the executive branch policy to the judicial system as a national
minimum standard. Id. In promulgating this policy, the CAT relied on the Recommended Executive
Branch Model Policy:
Executive Branch employees do not have a right, nor should they have an expectation, of
privacy while using any Government office equipment at any time, including accessing
the Internet, using E-mail ....By using Government office equipment, executive branch
employees imply their consent to disclosing the contents of any files or information
maintained or [that] pass-through Government office equipment.
FEDERAL CIO COUNCIL, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, RECOMMENDED EXECUTIVE
BRANCH MODEL POLICY/GUIDANCE ON "LIMITED PERSONAL USE" OF GOVERNMENT OFFICE
EQUIPMENT 6 (May 19, 1999), at http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/cio.pdf [hereinafter
MODEL POLICY].
43. Initial Policy, supra note 7.

44. Id.
45. Napster allows computer users to download songs for a monthly fee. Jefferson Graham,
Slimmed-down Napster Going Back Online (Jan. 1, 2002), at
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2002/0 l/09/napster-usat.htm.
46. Glacier is a "back door program" that permits third parties to acquire control of a desktop
computer or operating system without consent of the user and allows them to manipulate the
computer's hardware. ADDENDUM TO INITIAL POLICY, supra note 18, at 13.

47. Quake is a game program that allows third parties to gain access to a computer desktop
during a game session and control the contents of the desktop. Id.
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Network ("DCN"), and to delegate to a committee the authority to block
other tunneling protocol that may cause security breaches.48
D. The Goals ofAdopting the Initial Policy.
The Judicial Conference has been debating whether to approve or
dismantle the computer program that will subject judicial employees,
including judges, to monitoring their Internet use at work.4 '9 The CAT
issued a policy to allow federal courts to monitor Internet use in order to
deter inappropriate usage, e.g., downloading music and pornography or
playing games.50 The Initial Policy sought to prohibit Internet use that
congests or disrupts normal service and that generates extraneous
governmental expense.' The Initial Policy clearly stated that court
employees using the computer system would be subject to monitoring,
and therefore have no reasonable expectation of privacy.52
The aim of the Initial Policy is twofold: (1) to secure the courts'
computers by protecting them from viruses and hackers53 and (2) to
ensure that employees do not waste time browsing the Internet for
leisure. 4 Dick Carelli, a spokesman for the AO, stated that the American
taxpayer does not want "government employees us[ing] government
computers on government time for pursuits that are obviously not jobrelated . ..
E. How the Software Works
The federal judiciary implemented a closed computer system
enabling judges and other judiciary employees to communicate

48. Initial Policy, supra note 7.
49. Rosen, supra note 11.
50. Brian Krebs, FederalCourts Alter Plan to MonitorEmployees' Net Use (Sept. 10, 2001),
at http://www.newsbytes.com/cgi-bin/udt/im.display.printable?cient.id=newsbytes&stry.id= 169.
51. Robyn Weisman, JudicialPanel Approves Net Usage Rules (Sept. 20, 2001), at
http://wwwnewsfactor.com/perl/story/13650.html.
52. Krebs, supra note 50.
53. A hacker is defined as "a computer user who attempts to gain unauthorized access to files
and various systems." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 638 (4th ed. 2001).
54. Maria M. Perotin, Privacy Matters: E-mail Decision May Send Strong Signal, FORT
WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, Oct. 8, 2001, at 15.
55. Id.; MODEL POLICY, supra note 42, at 2 ("Taxpayers have the right to depend on their
Government to manage their tax dollars wisely and effectively. Public confidence in the
productiveness of government is increased when members of the public are confident that their
government is well managed and assets are used appropriately.").
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internally.16 The system was designed to block third parties from gaining
access into the judiciary's computer system.57 Despite the exclusion of
third parties Leonidas Ralph Mecham, the Director of the AO, told the
CAT that judges had been complaining about poor Internet response
time." After investigating such complaints, Director Mecham discovered
that the increased response time during business hours was due to the
fact that three to seven percent of the judiciary's browser traffic involved
streaming media, e.g., audio and video downloads. 9 Since the Internet
slowdown was due to non-work related Internet use that imposed a
financial burden on the judiciary, Director Mecham installed software to
identify the potential hackers. 60
The software recorded downloads of mpeg movie files and MP3
music files. 6' It also notified federal judiciary employees, 62 each time
they logged onto the Internet, via an electronic banner, that they should
expect no privacy. 63 The software generated reports that were sent to
Director Mecham's deputy, Clarence Lee, who determined whether the
music files were inappropriate.M If the files were inappropriate, Lee
would send a letter to the chief judge of that circuit identifying the files,
the computers from which they were downloaded and would recommend
disciplinary action.

56. Neil Lewis, Monitoring of Judiciary Computers IsBacked, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2001, at
A13..
57. Id.
58. Rosen, supra note 11.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. id.
62. Employees included court staff, judges, public defenders, probation officers and
magistrates. Maura Dolan, Defiant Judges Bar Monitoring of Staff Net Use, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9,
2001, § 2,at 10.
Krebs, supra note 50; ADDENDUM TO INITIAL POLICY, supra note 18, at 11. The
63. Id.;
Addendum recommended
[t]hat Judicial Conference require the Administrative Office to disseminate to all judicial
branch employees now and hereafter hired, and to request each court prominently to
display on screen prior to access of the DCN and the Internet, a.banner notice clearly and
conspicuously disclosing ... that the use of the system is subject to.the interim
policy.., that the contents of the use may be viewed and recorded, that the employee's
use of the system constitutes consent to such viewing and recording ....
Id.
64. Rosen, supra note 11.
65. Id.
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F. Opposition to Adoption of an Internet Use Policy
Although many critics of the Initial Policy acknowledge the
"government's legitimate interest in protecting its computer resources
from internal abuse and external threats[,]" 66 the source of contention lies
in the manner chosen by the CAT to achieve such goals. More
specifically, most critics were outraged with the proposed policy that all
judiciary employees, including judges, must waive all expectations of
privacy in communications made when using office equipment,
including computers.67
Judges have criticized the monitoring on grounds that it is an
invasion of privacy and that it may violate the ECPA.6 8 Judges stated that
if e-mail is analogous to a phone call, then software that monitors it
without notice to the parties, violates the anti-wiretapping regulations.69
However, if e-mail is analogous to a postcard, then it is open for
everyone to read, and individual privacy is not jeopardized.70
In 1999, the AO installed the monitoring software in New Orleans,
San Francisco and Washington. 7' The Ninth Circuit protested the
monitoring of its computers. 72 The judges temporarily disconnected the
monitoring software claiming that it was illegal.73 Judge Alex Kozinski,
74
of the Ninth Circuit, claimed that the monitoring violated the ECPA.
Judge Kozinski further noted that adoption of the monitoring would
66. Gordon, supra note 26.
67. Alex Kozinski, Privacy on Trial, WALL ST. J., Sep. 4, 2001, at A22. Ninth Circuit Judge,
Alex Kozinski, addressed this article as an "open letter to federal judges." Id.
68. ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, EPIC Urges Federal Judiciary to End
Workplace Monitoring,Epic ALERT 8.16, Sept. 6, 2001, at
http://www.epic.org/alert/EPIC-Alert_8.16.html [hereinafter Epic ALERT]. See infra Part IV.B.
69. Shelley Souza, Outside the Box: Drawingthe Line on Privacy(Aug. 14, 2001), at
http://www.biz.yahoo.com/opt/010814/ti szlwm4efdxlkrlu3_.uva.html.
70. Id.
7 1. Lewis, supra note 56. See Jim Tyre, JudicialMonitoring: The BureaucratBlinks, Privacy
Wins (Sept. 8, 2001), at
http://www.censorware.net/article.pl?sid=01/09/08/0420219&mode=nested&tid=l, for a discussion
of the AO's implementation of the new "censorware" on the federal judicial system.
72. Barbara Kate Repa, Computers and Email on the Job: They're Watching You (2001), at
http://www.nolo.comlencyclopedia/articles/emp/computers.html.
73. Id.
74. Michael Fraase, Even Federal Judges Subject to Workplace Privacy Issues (Aug. 8,
2001), at http://www.farces.com/farces/997291903/index-html. Judge Kozinski suggested that an
independent investigator be hired to determine whether any civil or criminal violations of the ECPA
were committed when 30,000 judicial employees were subjected to surreptitious monitoring for
several months. Kozinski, supra note 67 ("If we in the judiciary are not vigilant in acknowledging
and correcting mistakes made by those acting on our behalf, we will surely lose the moral authority
to pass judgment on the misconduct of others.").
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"betray ourselves, our employees and all those who look to the federal
courts for guidance in adopting policies that are both lawful and
enlightened."75
The Initial Policy would require computer users to give up all
privacy.7 6 "Turn on your computer, and everything on it, your recipes,
your telephone book, anything you type on it becomes accessible by the
employer.. . ."" Judge Kozinski noted that "[t]his kind of intrusion is
uncivilized."78 Some employees use the Internet on their lunch hours for
personal purposes, such as filling prescriptions or checking bank account
balances.79 Such activities should remain private. 0 Otherwise, a judiciary
employee's computer is an open book.8' Employees should not have to
give up their rights without a showing of necessity.82
As the most vocal critic, Judge Kozinski analogized the proposed
policy to the "signs at federal prisons warning inmates that their phone
conversations could be monitored."83 For Judge Kozinski, judiciary
employees, just like prisoners, would have to acknowledge that by using
the office equipment their consent would be implied with or without
cause. 84 He premised his objections to monitoring on two bedrock
principles of the judicial system; case deliberations should be kept
confidential and loyal judicial employees should be trusted. 5 Placement
of this trust in judicial employees parallels such employees' willingness
to uphold the integrity of the judiciary. For example, after employees
were told that downloading certain files put a strain on the system, there
was a dramatic decrease in bandwidth.86 The Initial Policy suggests that
judicial employees are not trusted, and therefore their communications

75. Gina Holland, Judges Bracefor Web Monitoring (2001), at
http://www.news.excite.comnews/ap/010919/14/judges-privacy.
76. Dolan, supra note 62.
77. Id. (quoting Judge Kozinski).
78. Joan Biskupic, Judges Debate Own Privacy, USA TODAY, Sept. 7, 2001, at IA.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Lewis, supra note 56.
82. Id.
83. Tony Mauro, Federal Courts Adopt New Online Policies, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 24, 2001;
Kozinski, supra note 67.
84. Kozinski, supra note 67 ("If we succumb to bureaucratic pressure and adopt the proposed
policy, we will betray ourselves, our employees and all those who look to the federal courts for
guidance in adopting policies that are both lawful and enlightened.").
85. Kozinski, supra note 67. The Model Policy also upholds this principle.. MODEL POLICY,
supra note 42, at 2 ("The relationship between the Executive Branch and the employees who
administer the functions of the Government is one based on trust.").
86. Kozinski, supra note 67.
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must be monitored. 87 "[L]oyalty and dedication wilt in the face of
mistrust." 88 According to Judge Kozinski, the adoption of such a policy
involves important principles, and deserves "discussion, deliberation and
[an] informed debate." 9 Furthermore, Kozinski claimed that "[i]f we
take an extreme position as employers, then when the same issue comes
up in a case where we have to decide as judges, we're more likely to
approve the extreme position. So in a way we've prejudged the issue by
conduct." 9
It is argued that deliberation did not take place prior to the
formulation of the CAT's Initial Policy.9 Judge Kozinski noted that
Director Mecham's investigation found that only about three to seven
percent of Internet traffic is non-work related.92 Given that employees
are entitled to use their telephone and computer for personal errands
during non-work time, e.g., lunches and breaks, and that non-work time
takes up more than three to seven percent of the workday, the judiciary
is "already coming out ahead."93 In an-interview, Kozinski stated that, in
the federal workforce,
your telephone is owned by the government, but you don't'expect them
to tape phone conversations with your mother ....
Your desk is owned
by the government, but you don't expect them to rifle through it and
make a copy of your diary. To say-just because the computer is
owned by your employer-that you have no private space in it is'
going
in the wrong direction.94
He further criticized that judges are mature enough to preside over
death penalty cases, decide whether individuals are sent to prison and
how much money one is awarded, but cannot be trusted with using a
web browser.95
Judge Edith Jones, of the Fifth Circuit, has also voiced objections to
the Initial Policy. 96 According to her, the Initial policy "bespeak[s] a
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Stefanie Olsen, Judges Oppose Monitoring of Internet Use (Sept. 10, 2001), at
http://zdnet.com.com/2100-11 05-272865.html.
91. Kozinski, supra note 67.
92. id.
93. Id.
94. Bob Egelko, Privacy During Downtime, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 2, 2001, at A4.
95. Linda Wertheimer & Scott Horsley, Federal Judges Struggle with Standards for
Employer Monitoring of Worker Internet Use (Aug. 16, 2001), at
http://www.websense.com/company/news/companynews/01/081601.cfm.
96. Letter from Honorable Edith H. Jones, Justice, United States Court of Appeals for the
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solution in search of a problem." 97 She objected to the policy on several
grounds. First, the recommendations seek to centralize decision-making
about Internet and computer usage policies in a single national body,
which is contrary to the longstanding trend toward decentralized court
management.98 Thus, the policy confers great discretionary powers to the
AO that should, instead, be retained by each judge's own chambers. 99

Second, the recommendations would "advise judicial branch employees
that no one, including judges, has any expectation of privacy in his use
of government computers for Internet or e-mail purposes ...[which] is

the equivalent of sanctioning wiretapping of telephones or searches of
office files to 'prevent unauthorized use of government property.''0
Judge Jones noted that the proposal makes it possible not only for
judicial bureaucrats to monitor computer traffic in judges' chambers, but
also for individuals with no links or loyalty to the judiciary to monitor
computer use by judges.' 1 Finally, since the CAT's report cites to only a
few dozen examples of misuse among 30,000 judiciary employees, the
recommended monitoring program seems highly disproportionate. '°2
There appears to be no sufficient reason why less intrusive means would
not suffice to discourage Internet or computer misuse.' 3
Chief Judge Mary Schroeder, of the Ninth Circuit, was concerned
that the policy on Internet use implemented by the court was unclear. '°4
Chief Judge Schroeder stated that judges want to reach a "responsible,
common sense resolution.., without further acrimony."'0 ' She further
noted that judges were troubled about "'the propriety, and even the
legality, of monitoring Internet usage by court employees' without their

Fifth Circuit, to Honorable Edwin L. Nelson, Chairman, CAT Committee (Aug. 18, 2001),
available at http://cryptome.org/jones-v-cat.htm [hereinafter Jones Letter].
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Krebs, supra note 50.
102. Jones Letter, supra note 96.
103. Id. For example, in March, after the monitoring program became publicized, "the
Executive Committee issued a communique regarding appropriate usage that was widely
disseminated throughout the judiciary .... [Thereafter] bandwidth usage immediately and
dramatically declined in response to that communique." Id.
104. Lisa Gill, Judges Turn Off Monitoring-on Their Own Computers (Aug. 9, 2001), at
http://www.newsfactor.com/perl/story/l12659.html.
105. U.S. Judges to Force Cyber Snooping Issue (2001), at
http://www.ananova.com/news/story/sm-370852.html?menu=news.technology.
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consent."' 6 She urged judicial leaders to focus on detecting hackers,
rather than monitoring judicial employees.' °7
Another opponent of the Initial Policy, Ninth Circuit Senior Judge
Alfred Goodwin, referred to the monitoring as "a busybody project by a
few misguided bureaucrats."'' 8 Judge Michael Luttig, of the Fourth
Circuit, stated that all judges "should be concerned when anyone,
especially the government, is able, whenever it wishes, to monitor our
use of the Internet."'"° An anonymous district court judge has handled
cases requiring visits to pornographic websites." Therefore, judges and
clerks may have a legitimate reason to view these sites.'
The Federal Judges Association "2 opposed the monitoring of
electronic communications of judges' chambers because it is a threat to
judicial independence. ' 3 An official at the United States Supreme Court,
which is not governed by the actions of the Judicial Conference, stated
that "the Court does have a computer use policy which employees sign
and acknowledge when they come on board." 4 Internet access is limited
to a few computers at the Court and most of them are not connected to
the Internet because of security reasons."'
The Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy Information
Center ("EPIC"), Marc Rotenberg, wrote to the Judicial Conference
urging it not to monitor the computer usage of judiciary employees. 6 He
argued that giving notice to judges does not resolve the Fourth
Amendment issues raised when judiciary networks are monitored."' The
Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF") opposed the monitoring on the
grounds that if judges cannot be trusted to use judicial computers
properly, then they should not be trusted to administer the courts." 8
106. Tyre, supra note 71.
107. Egelko, supra note 94.
108. Jonathan Groner, Bench Brawl Erupts Over E-Monitoring: Judges' Privacy Concerns
May Spur Compromise at Meeting, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 10, 2001, at 2.
109. Id.
110. Id.
11. Id.
112. The Federal Judges Association is an organization that represents 85% of federal judges.
Gordon, supra note 26.
113. Id.
114. Groner, supra note 108. The official at the United States Supreme Court has refused to
detail the policy implemented at the United States Supreme Court and the amount of time it has
been in place. Id.
115. Id.
116. Epic ALERT, supra note 68.
117. Id. See infra Part IV.A.
118. Mark Gibbs, Monitoring the Asylum (Sept. 10, 2001), at
http://www.nwfusion.com/columnists/2002/09 I Ogibbs.html.
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The EFF also argued that privacy concerns are raised when a nonjudicial commercial company is monitoring judicial Internet use, caserelated materials and private correspondence within the court system." 9
Lawmakers have also opposed unrestricted judicial monitoring. 2 °
Senator Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) and Representatives John Conyers,
Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard Berman (D-Cal.) question the legality of such
monitoring. They claim that even if the proposal is legal, the unrestricted
monitoring would "lower employee morale, create an atmosphere of
distrust and interfere with employees' reasonable expectation of
privacy.",12' Representative Berman, a member of the House of Judiciary
Subcommittee on Courts, said that he would "oppose any efforts by the
Judicial Conference to systematically monitor the electronic
communications and Internet use of judicial employees.' ' 22 Although he
deemed it appropriate for a supervisor to monitor the Internet use of an
employee in certain situations, he found it inappropriate for the courts to
monitor Internet use of employees because judges would face the task of
ruling on issues of employee privacy. '
In response to the objections raised in opposition to the monitoring,
David Sellers, the chief spokesman for the AO, stated that all the
concerns were overblown.'24 According to Sellers, "[t]here is not, there
never has been, and there is not expected ever to be a situation in which
e-mail will be monitored .... All that was ever monitored was the
transfer of large
files, big movements of information that clog up the
25
bandwidth.'
District Judge Edwin Nelson of Birmingham' said that the
"Constitution gives judges independence in decision-making... [but]
'does not place us above the law or free us from responsibility and
accountability that taxpayers have a right to expect of public
servants.", 2 7 J. Harvie Wilkinson HI, Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit,
119. Id.
120. Gordon, supra note 26.
121. Id.
122. Stefanie Olsen, Judges Back Down on Workplace Monitoring (Sept. 10, 2001), at
http://news.com.com/2102-1023-272865.html?legacy=cnet&tag=pff.
123. Id.
124. Groner, supra note 108.
125. Id.
126. Judge Nelson is the chairman of the CAT. Kozinski, supra note 67.
127. Weisman, supra note 51. In November 2001, California Judge Ronald Kline was charged
with possession of child pornography. See Barbara Whitaker, Judge Facing Pornography Charges
is Unopposed on Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2001, at A10. The charge arose from information
provided by individuals who surf the Internet in search of child pornographers. Id. A hacker infected
the judge's computer with a virus and made an unauthorized copy of his hard drive. Id.
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stated that there is a likelihood for abuse of the Internet in the workplace
or a decrease in employee productivity.128 Moreover, he stated that the
public has the right to expect that computers, which are purchased with
taxpayers' money, should be used for public business.' 29 Chief Judge
Wilkinson also claimed that "special precautions" are taken to ensure
that the "confidences of judicial communications are preserved."'"3
III. THE ADOPTED POLICY
The Adopted Policy has been approved by the Judicial Conference
on an interim basis.' The policy will be in effect only until the Judicial
Conference is able to agree upon a permanent policy."' The Adopted
Policy is modeled after the General Services Administration's 33proposal
and guidance on the appropriate use of government equipment. 1
A. The Judicial Conference'sAdopted Policy
Director Mecham, in a letter to Judge Nelson, Chairman of the
CAT, suggested that the two most objectionable recommendations be
removed from the policy.' 34 The objected recommendations pertained to
employees waiving their privacy rights and that all computers display a
banner message.'35 Director Mecham pointed out that judges have
36
legitimate interests in protecting the privacy of their communications.'
He further noted that complete abandonment of privacy expectations
was not necessary to achieve the goal of managing judiciary resources.131
Perhaps fearing that the Judicial Conference would not adopt the

Child pornography was found in the judge's work and personal computers. Id. As of August 10,
2002, Judge Kline was under house arrest and awaiting trial in federal court. Judge Pleads Not
Guilty to Child Sex Charges, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2002, § 2, at 3.
128. Groner, supra note 108.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. News Release, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Conference Approves
Recommendations on Electronic Case File Availability and Internet Use 1 (Sept. 19, 2001), at
http://www.uscourts.gov./Press-Releases/jc901 a.pdf [hereinafter Recommendation Approval].
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Fax from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Director of AO, to Honorable Edwin L. Nelson,
Chairman of the CAT, (Sept. 6,2001), at http://censorware.net/documents/mecham-20010906.pdf
[hereinafter Mecham Fax].
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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proposal, the CAT 38revised its recommendations from unrestricted to
limited monitoring.
On September 19, 2001, the Judicial Conference adopted the
revised recommendations proposed by the CAT.' 39 The approval calls for
the following actions: (1) decentralization of Internet access to
individual courts such that all computers connected to the DCN access
the Internet through national Internet gateways under the control of the
AO; (2) give individual courts the responsibility of enforcing appropriate
use policies, which the AO may examine and comment upon; (3) adopt
the model use policy developed by the Federal Chief Information
Officers Council as a national minimum standard defining appropriate
Internet use;'4 0 (4) give the AO the authority to take appropriate steps to
block such traffic as Napster, Glacier and Quake from computers
connected to the DCN, and give the CAT the authority to block other
tunneling protocol that may cause security breaches; (5) no monitoring
of employees' e-mail use and no waiver of all expectations of privacy.'
The Judicial Conference decided to omit from the newly Adopted
Policy the proposition that judiciary employees have no right to privacy
when they use the Internet. 142 Whilethe policy does not guarantee any
specific right to privacy at the workplace for the judiciary, privacy
experts view the omission as a victory for judges who had fought to keep
e-mail communication private. 4 1 In fact, Judge Kozinski, the fiercest
opponent of the original recommendation, was pleased with the outcome
primarily because "there's no monitoring of individual computers, and

138. Mecham Fax, supra note 134.
139. Recommendation Approval, supra note 131. The policies were supposed to be debated at
a regular meeting of the conference on September 11, 2001, but the meeting was canceled due to the
terrorist attacks on New York City and the Pentagon. Mauro, supra note 83. Instead of waiting for
another conference, Chief Justice William Rehnquest, decided to submit the issue to the Judicial
Conference for a vote by mail. Id.
140. Inappropriate use of judiciary computers includes:
the creation, downloading, viewing, storage, copying, or transmission of sexually
explicit or sexually oriented materials ...materials related to illegal gambling, illegal
weapons, terrorist activities, and any other illegal activities or activities otherwise
prohibited ... [a]ny personal use that could cause congestion, delay or disruption of
service to any government system or equipment ... [a]ny use that could generate more
than minimal additional expense to the government ....
Recommendation Approval, supra note 131.
141. Recommendation Approval, supra note 131. The Approval explicitly excludes Section F
of the MODEL POLICY, which allows for unrestricted monitoring. Compare Recommendation

Approval, supra note 131 with MODEL POLICY, supra note 42.
142. Andy Sullivan, Judges Set Precedentfor Workplace Privacy (Sept. 19, 2001), at
http://www.techtv.com/news/intemet/story/0,24195,3348780,00.html.
143. Id.
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there's not going to be.' 44 According to Judge Kozinski, "[i]t was a
serious mistake for Mr. Mecham and the [technology] committee to try
to ram this through without the normal process of consultation and
deliberation that has been the hallmark of judicial governance .... I'm
glad they have recognized their error and withdrawn their highly
intrusive proposal.' 45
B. JudicialElectronicMonitoring Modeled After the
Executive Branch Plan
The electronic monitoring plan that the judicial branch has adopted
is modeled after the plan that was recommended for employees of
executive agencies.146 In 1999, the General Services Administration47
distributed to all executive branch agencies a proposed model policy'
regarding appropriate use of government equipment. ' The Federal
Chief Information Officers Council developed the model policy after
discussions with various government ethics, legal procurement and
human resource experts. 49 Since its formulation, the model policy has
been adopted by approximately two-thirds of executive branch
agencies. 50 The remaining one-third have imposed more restrictive
policies.'5'
Limited personal use of government equipment by employees
during non-working hours is authorized use of the government's
property.1 2 However, authorized use cannot interfere with official
business and cannot involve more than minimal additional expense to
the government. 15 Inappropriate personal use of government equipment
by employees is prohibited. 4 Employees are responsible for ensuring
Groner, supra note 108.
Id. (alteration in original).
Recommendation Approval, supra note 131.
MODEL POLICY, supra note 42.
148. ADDENDUM TO INITIAL POLICY, supra note 18, at 9.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
144.
145.
146.
147.

152.

MODEL POLICY, supra note 42, at 4.

153. Id.
154. Inappropriate use of government equipment includes any personal use that causes delay,
congestion or disruption of services to any government system. Id. Examples of inappropriate use
include: accessing greeting cards or video, sound or other large file attachments that can disrupt the
government's system; creating, copying, or transmitting chain letters; illegal or offensive activities;
creating, downloading, viewing, copying, or transmitting sexually explicit materials; creating,
downloading, viewing, copying or transmitting materials relating to illegal gambling, illegal
weapons, or terrorist activities; engaging in outside fund-raising activity; any use that causes more
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that a false impression is not created when government computers are
utilized for personal use.'55 If the personal use may
5 6 be interpreted to
represent the agency, a disclaimer must be provided.'
Government employees do not have a right to privacy when using
the government computer at any time.'57 When an employee of the
executive branch uses the government's computer system, the
employees implicitly consent to disclosure of the contents of their
Internet use.' s For personal matters to remain private, employees should
avoid using the government's computer.5 9 Any communication made via
the government's computer is understood to be not secure, not private
and not anonymous.160
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ADOPTED POLICY

This section briefly addresses the legality of monitoring the Internet
use of employees through a short analysis of the Fourth Amendment and
the ECPA. This section also endeavors to critique the Adopted Policy
through a brief history of the judicial administrative system and the
essential traits such administration must incorporate if it is to be
successful. An examination of the Adopted Policy leads to the
conclusion that it is deficient for a number of reasons.
A. FourthAmendment Concerns
Government employees, specifically judicial employees, may find
privacy protection of their Internet communications in the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 6' The Fourth Amendment
guarantees an individual's privacy and dignity against certain intrusive62
acts by government entities, including government employers.'
than a minimal additional expense to the government; and the unauthorized acquisition, use,
reproduction, transmission or distribution of any controlled information including computer
software, data, privacy information, copyrighted or trademarked information. Id. at 4-5.
155. MODEL POLICY, supra note 42, at 5.
156. Id. Disclaimer stating that: "[tlhe contents of this message are mine personally and do not
reflect any position of the Government or my agency" would be deemed sufficient. Id.
157. Id. at 6.

158. Id.
159. MODEL POLICY, supra note 42, at 6.

160. Id.
161. U.S.

CONST. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .... Id.
162. S. Elizabeth Wilbom, Revisiting the Public/Private Distinction:Employee Monitoring in
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In Katz v. United States, 163 the Supreme Court established a two-prong
test to determine whether the Fourth Amendment is violated: (1) the
person must have a subjective expectation of privacy and (2) the
expectation must be reasonable.' 6 Under the reasonable expectation
of
6
privacy test, an intrusion constitutes an unlawful search or seizure.1 1
The Supreme Court first addressed the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment to the privacy expectations of government employees in
O'Connorv. Ortega. 66 The Court held that government employees may
have a reasonable privacy expectation at work. 167 It further emphasized
that a government employer is required to provide a legitimate workrelated reason for the search.' 68 "[W]hether an employee has a reasonable
expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis" and
depends on "the operational realities of the workplace." 169
In Chandler v. Miller,7 ° the Supreme Court held that a government
employer has to show the presence of a special need in order to engage
in certain monitoring techniques."' The Court struck down a state statute
that imposed drug testing on political candidates.'72 The Court held that
the state failed to meet the "special needs" exception to the warrant and
probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment.'73 The state was
unable to show any problem with drug abuse among state officials and
further failed to show that its normal law enforcement methods were
insufficient to adequately address any potential problem.'7 4 Chandler and
O'Connortogether establish that "indiscriminate, groundless monitoring
of personal conversations or activities will likely be held unreasonable
and violative of the Fourth Amendment guarantee of privacy.' 75
Given the "operational realities" of the judiciary, judiciary
employees have a reasonable privacy expectation at work. In approving
the Adopted Policy, the Judicial Conference arguably failed to articulate
a legitimate work-related reason to justify the monitoring. Although a
the Workplace, 32 GA. L. REV. 825, 867-68 (1998).
163. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
164. Id.
at 361.
165. Wilborn, supra note 162, at 868.
166. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
167. Id. at 717.
168. Id. at 722.
169. Id. at 717-18.
170. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
171. Id. at 313-14.
172. Id. at 318.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 320-22.
175. Wilbom, supra note 162, at 872.
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computer slowdown is a work-related reason, it does not justify the
breadth of the monitoring. Arguably, no special need existed to warrant
the monitoring.'7 6 Therefore, the indiscriminate application of the
Adopted Policy is unreasonable and arguably violates the Fourth
Amendment guarantee of privacy.
B. Electronic Communications PrivacyAct of 1986
The ECPA17 1 prohibits the intentional monitoring of a facility
without notice through an electronic communication service and the
intentional accessing of a facility in order to obtain, alter or prevent
authorized access through a wire or an electronic communication as an
offense.17 ECPA section 2511(2)(a)(i) allows "a provider of wire or
electronic communication service ... to intercept ... [a] communication
in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity
which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the
,, 171
protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service ....
Relying on ECPA section 2511(2)(a)(i), employers justify
monitoring on the grounds that it is necessary to prevent excessive
personal use of the system 80 However, many people have argued that
monitoring of judicial employees violates the ECPA.'' The ECPA
allows interception of communications with the consent of only one of
the parties involved. 82 The CAT installed the monitoring program
without notifying or securing the consent of judicial employees. 83 For
this reason, Judge Kozinski has argued that the Justice Department
176.

As Judge Kozinski noted, only three to seven percent of judiciary employees' Internet

usage is not related to work. Kozinski, supra note 67. These statistics may not suffice to constitute a
special need.

177. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.). Wire communication is defined as the transfer or transmission by means of a wire, cable or
other connection from the beginning to the end. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2000). Intercept is defined as the
acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication through the use of any
electronic, mechanical or other device. Id. Electronic, mechanical, or other device means any device
or apparatus that can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication. Id. Person
means any employee, or agent of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof, and
any individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust or corporation. Id. Judges are

assumed to be included under the ECPA because they are governmental employees.
178. Id. § 2701.
179. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2000).
180. Nathan Watson, The Private Workplace and the Proposed "Notice of Electronic
MonitoringAct": "Is Notice" Enough? 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 79, 84-85 (2001) (citation omitted).
181. Rosen, supra note 11.
182. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).
183. Rosen, supra note 11.
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should initiate an investigation to determine whether any civil remedies
are owed to judicial employees whose privacy rights may have been
violated pursuant to the ECPA. '84
The merit of Judge Kozinski's contention is limited by the fact that
the ECPA arguably does not provide effective protection for employee
privacy. Although the ECPA does impose some restrictions on the
manner or the extent of employee monitoring, its many exceptions
swallow the rule. For example, ECPA section 2510(5)(a) allows a
service provider to intercept "any wire or electronic communication
service in the ordinary course of its business" which the user utilizes in
such capacity.'85 Employers with their own e-mail system may fall
within the definition of a service provider, thereby allowing an
employee's Internet use to be monitored without violating the ECPA' 86
C. History of the JudicialAdministrative System
Prior to 1939, the Department of Justice, an executive agency,
performed the judiciary's administrative duties,'87 with each district
judge responsible for court administration within the district."8
Beginning in the early 1900s, however, a movement towards an
integrated administrative system began.'89 In 1922, Congress created the
Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, today known as the Judicial
Conference, to "serve as the principal policy making body concerned
with the administration of the United States Courts."' 90 Among other
things, 28 U.S.C. section 331 '9' specifically grants the Judicial
Conference the authority to "make a comprehensive survey of the
condition of business in the courts of the United States .... submit
184. Id.
185. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a).
186. Watson, supra note 180, at 86.
187. Patrick Donald McCalla, Note: Judicial Disciplining of Judges is Constitutional, 62 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1263, 1265 (1989) (describing administrative duties as budgeting, managing and
paying salaries).
188. Id.
189. Harlington Wood, Jr., Judiciary Reform: Recent Improvements in Federal Judicial
Administration, 44 AM. U. L. REV., 1557, 1561 (1995) (noting that such movement was initiated by
judicial reformers like Roscoe Pound and William Howard Taft "to improve cumbersome court
procedures and inefficient judicial administration").
190. Judicial Conference, supra note 5. At its inception, the Conference of Senior Circuit
Judges was composed of the chief justice and the chief judge of each circuit. McCalla, supra note
187, at 1265. In 1948, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 331, changing the name of the Conference of
Senior Circuit Judges to the Judicial Conference of the United States. Judicial Conference, supra
note 5.
191. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000).
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suggestions and recommendations to the various courts to promote
uniformity of management procedures and the expeditious conduct of
court business.' 92 The Judicial Conference also participates in regulating
judicial activities by promulgating ethical standards for judges and court
personnel.'93
In 1939, Congress passed the Administrative Office Act, thereby
completing the judicial administration reform movement. 94 With this
Act, Congress created the AO, which assumed the administrative duties
previously performed by the Department of Justice. 95 The Director of
the AO, appointed by the Supreme Court, performs the statutory duties
of the AO under the supervision and direction of the Judicial
Conference. 96 This arrangement reflects the view that the ultimate
responsibility for managing the courts should remain with the Judicial
Conference.'9 The Judicial Conference adopts governing policies and
procedures for the federal courts and the AO serves the Judicial
Conference by implementing and executing such policies. 9 ' The AO
does not have direct management authority over the individual courts. 99
The Administrative Office Act of 1939 further Strengthened judicial
administration by creating Judicial Councils of the Circuits ("circuit
councils"). 200 Each circuit council consists of an equal number of trial
and appellate judges, with the circuit chief judge as chair.20' Circuit
councils have the power to "take such action as is appropriate to assure
the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts
within the circuit."' 2° However, by 1985, the federal judicial
administration system had become heavily centralized, thereby not

192. Id.
193. McCalla, supra note 187, at 1265.
194. Id. at 1265-66.
195. Wood, Jr., supra note 189, at 1562 (discussing that the administrative duties of the AO
consist of procurement, personnel and payroll, managing the budget and accounting, statistics
collection and reporting).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1563.
199. Id. at 1564.
200. Judge J. Clifford Wallace, Resolving Judicial Corruption While Preserving Judicial
Independence: ComparativePerspectives, 28 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 341, 348 (1998).
201. Id.
202. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(6)(B) (2000). "Thus, the administrative power, including the power to
investigate judges, was not given to the United States Supreme Court, the Judicial Conference of the
United States, or circuit or district courts, but to local independent administrative bodies comprised
of judges." Wallace, supra note 200, at 348-49.
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conforming to the "historical independence and autonomy
of the federal
' 23
courts in our constitutional system of government.
D. The Necessity of IncorporatingEssentialTraits into the
JudicialAdministrative System
The foregoing history and establishment of the judicial
administrative system illustrates the unique structure of the employeremployee relationship within the judiciary. It further enables analyzing
the problem of fitting judges and those who administer their conduct into
pre-existing employer-employee models of supervision. The role that
judges play in our society incorporates something more than one who
works for another under an express or implied contract, thereby
rendering the definition of "employee" inadequate as applied to
judges.20 Similarly, the roles that the Judicial Conference and the AO
play in administering the judiciary encompass something less than one
who "controls and directs a worker under an express or implied
contract," thereby rendering the definition of "employer" as inadequate
as applied to the Judicial Conference and the AO.205 In other words,
judges possess greater power than the definition for employee implies
and the Judicial Conference and the AO possess less control than the
definition of employer implies.
The inadequacy of applying the definitions of employer and
employee within the judiciary leads to the conclusion that administration
of the conduct of judges cannot be modeled after existing models of
employee management. The unique setup and function of the judiciary
cannot be compared to business entities or to other branches of the
government. Therefore, any policy adopted to supervise the conduct of
judges, including appropriate Internet use, must incorporate and balance
the following traits: judicial independence; and judicial accountability
and judicial security.
1. Judicial Independence
Judicial independence is one of the fundamental precepts upon
which the American system of government was founded.2°
203. Wood, Jr., supra note 189, at 1564-65.
204. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 428 (7th ed. 2000).
205. Id. at 430.
206. Harry T. Edwards, Regulating Judicial Misconduct and Divining "Good Behavior" for
FederalJudges, 87 MICH. L. REV. 765, 765 (1989).
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The "independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the
Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill
humors which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular
people
the
among
disseminate
sometimes
conjunctures,,
themselves ..... 207The principle of judicial independence can be found
in Article Ill, section 1 of the Constitution.2 0 ' Article Ill, section 1
provides that "[t]he Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated
Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office. ''2°
The, concept of judicial independence may be interpreted either
narrowly, as a set of protections for judges, or broadly, as a guarantee of
the integrity of the judicial system."O Judicial independence is a
multifaceted principle. Its facets are illustrated in the different kinds of
(2) personal
(1) substantive independence; 2 ''
independence:
2 2 (3) collective independence; 23 and (4) internal
independence;
independence.)
2. Judicial Accountability
Judicial accountability encompasses the notion that judges need to
be held accountable for their acts, both decisional and behavioral. This
notion is premised on the idea that the public, as taxpayers, has the right
to ensure that its money supports an efficiently run judiciary that
upholds the law and the rights of the people. The principles of judicial
accountability and judicial independence may be understood as
207. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see
also What is Judicial Independence, at http://www.ajs.org/cji/cji-whatisji.asp (last visited Dec. 22,
2002) (stating that judicial independence expresses the "ideal state of the judicial branch of
government"). Individual judges and the judicial branch of the government should be able to
function without any ideological influences. Id. Judicial independence allows for continuity and
stability in the legal system. The Importance of JudicialIndependence, at
http://www.ajs.org/cji/cjiimportance.asp (last visited Dec. 22, 2002).
208. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1.
209. Id.
210. John Ferejohn, Dynamics of Judicial Independence: Independent Judges, Dependent
Judiciary(Nov. 1998), at http://www.usc.edu/dept/law/symposia/judicial/pdf/ferejohn.pdf.
211. Also known as functional or decisional independence, substantive independence is
defined as "making judicial decisions and exercising official duties subject to no other authority but
the law." Maria Dakolias & Kim Thachuk, Attacking Corruption in the Judiciary: A Critical
Processin JudicialReform, 18 WIS. INT'L L.J. 353, 361 (2000).
212. Is defined as "adequately secured judicial terms of office and tenure." Id.
213. Is defined as "judicial participation in the central administration of courts." Id. at 361-62.
214. Is defined as "independence from judicial superiors and colleagues. Id. at 362.
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corollaries of one another. The greater the independence of the judiciary,
the greater the need for its accountability. If the judiciary is overly
independent and unmonitored, then the concept of accountability will
likely be compromised. Similarly, the stricter the standards of
accountability imposed on the judiciary, the less independent it will
remain. Although the two principles need to be properly balanced, one
will always hold greater weight. The balance should be tilted in favor of
judicial independence because such autonomy must be sufficiently
present before any need for accountability arises. Thus, the importance
of balancing the two principles with a tilt towards judicial independence
is paramount to successful administration of the judiciary.
3. Judicial Security
Judicial security consists of the confidence and discretion inherent
in decision-making. The functions performed by the judiciary in general,
and by judges in particular, involve great degrees of confidentiality-and
impartiality. For judges to be fair and impartial in the adjudication of
disputes assurances must be made as to the security of confidential
information within chambers. Lack of such security, in the aggregate,
could result in less confidence in the judiciary's ability to act as an
impartial and fair adjudicator.
E. Deficiencies of the Adopted Policy
Judges had been complaining about the slow Internet response time
of judiciary computers." 5 As a result, a preliminary monitoring of
judiciary employees' Internet use, by the AO identified the downloading
of music and movies as the problem.2 6 The AO used this information as
a basis for implementing an Internet use policy within the
judiciary. 21'Understandably,
taxpayers do not want to fund judiciary
employees' inappropriate use of the Internet.28 Even though judges have
criticized the Internet use policy, they do recognize the government's
legitimate interest in protecting its computers from internal abuse and
external threats. 219 While the Adopted Policy protects the foregoing
interests, it does so at the expense of judicial integrity. To avoid
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Rosen, supra note 11.
Biskupic, supra note 78.
See supra Part n.E.
Desmond, supra note 59.
Gordon, supra note 26.
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compromising judicial integrity, a less restrictive alternative should be
sought. Therefore, the deficiencies of the Adopted Policy stem from its
failure to properly balance the principles of judicial independence,
judicial accountability and judicial security. The Adopted Policy's
deficiencies include its threat to impartial decision-making, its vague
definition of inappropriate use, its lack of decentralization and its failure
to provide notice to judiciary employees.
1. Threat to Impartial Decision-Making
Despite strong arguments for implementing a monitoring policy in
the judiciary, strong reasons exist for dismantling the policy. First, since
judges are held to a higher standard of conduct, they should regulate
Internet use within the judiciary, not the AO. Second, monitoring would
jeopardize judges' duty of confidentiality by allowing third parties to
view confidential information. Finally, monitoring may cause judges to
have biases that would affect their decisions in future Internet
monitoring cases. The judiciary's integrity depends on its independence
from outside influences. If a case is presented before a judge where an
employer is monitoring an employee, the judge may identify with the
employee and rule against the employer. Because judges themselves do
not want to be monitored, they may rule in favor of employees' privacy
rights.
2. Defining Inappropriate Use
Inappropriate use includes "[a]ny personal use that could cause
congestion, delay, or disruption of service ... [and] any use that could
22
generate more than minimal additional expense to the government.,
Given this definition, Director Mecham, notified the judicial system that
the purpose of the new monitoring software is to enhance security,
reduce non-official use and prevent "clogging the system. ,,222 A survey
by the AO showed that three to seven percent of the judiciary's Internet
use consisted of radio and video broadcasts, which were unrelated to
official business.223
220.
judiciary
56.
221.
222.
223.

Similarly, Judge Kozinski has argued that approval by federal judges of monitoring in the
will "color" how monitored judges decide privacy cases in the future. Lewis, supra note
MODEL POLICY, supra note 42, at 4-5.
Souza, supra note 69.
Neil Lewis, Rebels in Black Robes Recoil at Surveillance of Computers, N.Y. TIMES,
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The definition of inappropriate use is overinclusive. A judge
listening to the radio, which leads to a slow Internet response, could be
deemed as an inappropriate use. However, the judge may be listening to
background classical music that may improve productivity. It is difficult
to draw the distinction between Internet radio broadcasts that result in
slow Internet response and Internet radio. broadcasts that enhance the
work performance of judges. Therefore, using the Internet to listen to the
radio should not be deemed inappropriate per se.
3. Lack of Decentralization
Although the Adopted Policy recognizes the importance of
decentralization, which ultimately leads to greater judicial independence,
it nonetheless, rests great oversight authority in the hands of the AO.
The Adopted Policy expresses the possibility of decentralization and
reaffirms the rule that individual courts are given responsibility to
enforce Internet use policies.224 However, simultaneously, the AO is
given authority to administer, manage and control operations and
security at gateways, and to further oversee each court's enforcement
methods. 2" Additionally, the CAT is given the authority to block "other
tunneling protocol" that it determines may cause security breaches.226
Such grant of authority is quite ambiguous and arbitrary because it
allows a committee that is not composed of judges to determine what
should and should not be blocked. Judges and their law clerks are in a
better position to know what web services are necessary for them to
perform their judicial functions. For this reason, the Adopted Policy
needs to address this tension between centralized and localized
management.
4. Notice
The Adopted Policy is deficient in yet another way. The Privacy
Expectations section of the Executive Model Policy has been omitted
from the Adopted Policy. 227 The deleted language required judges to give
up all expectations of privacy when using the Internet within the
Aug. 8, 2001, at Al.
224.

Recommendation Approval, supra at 131.

225.
226.

Id.
Id.

227.

Compare Recommendation Approval, supra note 131, with MODEL POLICY, supra note
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judiciary. 228 The omission does not guarantee or imply that there will be
no monitoring of judges' Internet use. It simply means that before any
monitoring, judges will be given notice. The issue of implementing
notice has been recommitted to the CAT.229
It is unclear whether removing the Privacy Expectations section
from the Adopted Policy implies that judiciary employees likewise have
a reasonable expectation of privacy. The substance and extent of what
constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy is uncertain. Perhaps
reasonableness should be defined in terms of "[t]he operational realities
of the workplace," such as "actual office practices. 230 It remains to be
seen whether a forthcoming notice policy will incorporate, and properly
balance, the concepts of judicial independence, judicial accountability
and judicial security.
V. PRELIMINARY STEPS TOWARDS A RESOLUTION

The Adopted Policy presents a solution in search of a problem. 3
The adoption of a policy to monitor judges' Internet use and e-mail is to
conclude that such use has compromised the judiciary's adjudicative
role. Among other things, the Adopted Policy purports to address
concerns of adjudicative efficiency and waste of government resources.
Concededly, these are legitimate and important interests that every
taxpayer has a right to enforce if they are being threatened. Whether
such resources are being abused to necessitate the implementation of the
Adopted Policy is unclear. In approving the Adopted Policy, the Judicial
Conference may have "short-circuited the normal collegial process of
deliberation and consultation. 232 Assuming the validity of this
contention, the failure of the Adopted Policy stems primarily from its
attempt to solve a non-existent, or at best, an ill-defined problem. A
sound resolution cannot exist without a clear and comprehensive
understanding of the problem.
A. Exclusion of Judgesfrom the Adopted Policy
Assuming arguendo that the problems enumerated by the CAT do
exist, the Adopted Policy is deficient for adopting the wrong means to
228.

MODEL POLICY supra note 42.

229.
230.
231.
232.

Recommendation Approval, supra note 131.
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987).
Jones Letter, supra note 96.
Kozinski, supra note 67.
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correct such problems. The modest evidence supplied by the CAT
reveals that inappropriate Internet use by judiciary employees causes
congestion of Internet access and generates extraneous governmental
expense.23 ' This evidence, even if valid, does not warrant curtailment of
judges' Internet use because methods less intrusive on judicial
independence may be available. For example, 30,000 employees exist in
the federal judiciary, only 1,800 of whom are judges.234 Restricting the
Internet use of the 28,200 non-judge employees is likely to have
substantially the same effect upon eradicating the problems of
congestion and waste as restricting the Internet use of all 30,000
employees, including judges. This would allow judges to retain a sense
of confidence and independence without giving them the impression that
they are not to be trusted. As Judge Kozinski noted, if judges are trusted
enough to decide difficult cases, they should be trusted with using the
Internet.235
B. The Sufficiency of Notice and Consent
Sufficient notice and consent may be a possible compromise in
making the Adopted Policy acceptable to all judiciary employees. A
notice requirement would inform employees as to the amount of privacy
that can be expected at work. To establish the degree of privacy, an
employer should articulate its monitoring policy no later than on the date
of hire. 23
An effective policy should explicitly state the communications that
will be monitored by the employer. The policy should note that the
computer system is the property of the workplace and should be used
solely for work-related purposes. The policy should also detail
prohibited Internet sites and clearly state that the employer could be held
231
liable for any communication transferred through the Internet.
Employees should be reminded that communications through the
Internet and e-mail may be read or intercepted by third parties. 231
Disciplinary action, such as discharge, could be imposed upon violators
of the policy in order to ensure compliance.2 9 An on-screen message
233. Weisman, supra note 51.
234. Holland, supra note 75.
235. Wertheimer & Horsley, supra note 95.
236. Methods of Electronic Monitoring (2000), at
http://www.solutionshrd.com/methods of-electronic-monitoring.htm.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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could appear on the user's computer every time the employee logs onto
the network as a constant reminder of the implemented policy." Before
a policy is executed, all judiciary employees should be aware of the
amount of privacy to expect. The adoption of the Notice of Electronic
Monitoring Act ("NEMA") 24' may be a manner of providing such
expectation of privacy.
1. Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act
242

In 2000, the NEMA was introduced in Congress but•.did
not pass.
• 241
The bill does not ban, or even limit, electronic monitoring. It merely
requires prior notification
to monitor its employees'
• •
244by employers
electronic communications. The purposes of the bill are sound. Since
e-mail is readily available, employers are concerned that employees may
use it for unrelated work. As a corollary, employers are concerned that
personal use of work computers may lead to potential liability,
245
disclosure of sensitive information and a waste of time and resources.
Employers hope that the notice will deter employees from using work
computers for personal purposes during work time.
The NEMA requires an employer to give notice before monitoring,
not before each instance of monitoring. 246 The employer must give
notice at the start of employment and continue to do so once a year as
long as monitoring persists. 7 The notice must be "clear and
conspicuous" and given "in a manner reasonably calculated to provide
actual notice ....,,28 The notice must provide the following: (1) the form
of communication or computer usage that is to be monitored; (2) the
means by which such monitoring will be accomplished; (3) the kinds of
information that will be monitored; (4) the frequency of the m6nitoring;
and (5) the manner in which gathered information will be used. 249

240. Id.
241. H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. (2d Sess. 2000).
242. Watson, supra note 180, at 80. The NEMA was introduced by Representatives Charles
Canady (R-Fla.) and Bob Barr (R-Ga.), and Senator Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.). Id.
243. H.R. 4908.
244. Id.
245. Watson, supra note 180, at 81-82. According to a survey from the American Management
Association, 45% of U.S. firms monitor their employees' electronic communications, including email, voice mail and Intemet use. Id. at 82.
246. H.R. 4908.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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The NEMA provides an exception to notice. 20 The employer must have
reasonable grounds to believe that; (1) the employee is engaged in
conduct that violates the rights of another person; (2) the conduct
and (3) the
involves "significant harm to the employer or other person;"
"monitoring will produce evidence of such conduct., 25'
The NEMA's purpose is to place employees on notice that
monitoring will occur in order to prevent employees' misuse of the
Internet and e-mail.2 52 The notice requirement would assist employees in
separating personal material from work-related material."3 Employees
would know what information is being monitored, and thus would be
able to plan accordingly. 54 Employees would be able to make decisions
on what personal information to bring to the workplace."'
2. Evaluation of the NEMA
There are many advantages to the NEMA. The notice requirement
256
Although employers
is fair because it allows for communication.
cannot expect employees to refrain completely from handling personal
matters at work, notice allows employers to state what is acceptable in
the workplace.257 A reasonable policy might, for example, allow
employees to use the Internet for personal matters before or after work
and -during lunchtime. 2" Also, a notice requirement will not burden
employers. 259 A notice requirement will deter employees from engaging
in activities that may lead to liability for the employers.26 Further, notice
gives employees the opportunity to decide if they wish to continue
working for the employer since notice is required before monitoring
takes place. 6
There are also criticisms to the NEMA. The first criticism is that
the NEMA does not require a certain method of giving notice to
employees.262 It only requires that the notice be "clear and conspicuous"
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id.
H.R. 4908.
Watson, supra note 180, at 96.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 100.
Watson, supra note 180, at 100.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Watson, supra note 180, at 97.
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and given "in a manner reasonably calculated to provide actual
notice .
,.6"One solution to the criticism is to require written notice or
a click-wrap agreement where the notice appears on the employee's
computer. " This would lead to minimal inconvenience to employers.269
A second criticism of the NEMA is that it would raise the duty of care
owed to employees.266 Employees might sue their employer based on a
failure to monitor those communications specified in the employer's
monitoring policy. 267 Where an employer puts its employees on notice
that it is monitoring e-mails, an employee sending harassing messages to
another employee may give rise to employer liability. 268 The harassed
employee could argue that the employer should have caught the
harassing employee through the monitoring of messages.2 6 9
Critics of the NEMA further argue that a notice requirement could
lead to more snooping by employers because it provides them with
legitimate reasons to monitor. 270 EPIC criticized the NEMA, stating that
it would discourage an employee from making a legitimate invasion of
privacy claim because employees would be effectively on notice. 7'
VI. CONCLUSION
Continuous monitoring of judges' Internet use and blockage of sites
deemed to be inappropriate assumes, without deliberation, that less
restrictive measures will not suffice. The Adopted Policy fails to realize
that judges need to be classified as a separate and distinct group from
other employees. The status of judges gives them the right to expect a
degree of'trust without a bureaucratic eye watching over them. Judges
are in a position to know what constitutes inappropriate Internet use
because they are capable of interpreting language to that effect. When
disputes arise as to what constitutes inappropriate Internet use, judges
will be called upon for a resolution. If judges can be trusted to decide

263. Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act, H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. (2d Sess. 2000).
264. Watson, supra note 180, at 97.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Watson, supra note 180, at 97-98.
270. Id. at 95.
271. Id. EPIC claims that the NEMA "may in fact increase the amount of overt surveillance, as
companies under directions from their attorneys, write very broad policies outlining a wide range of
possible surveillance activities that may not have previously occurred." Id.
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inappropriate Internet use as applied to litigants, they can be trusted to
decide the issue as applied to themselves.
On its surface, the judicial debate over whether to monitor federal
judges' Internet use of workplace computers appears to be simplistic. A
closer examination, however, reveals the various competing interests
that need to be considered when implementing such a policy. The
Adopted Policy should not be implemented on a permanent basis
because of its failure to adequately incorporate the principles of judicial
independence, judicial accountability and judicial security. These three
traits distinguish the employer-employee relationship within the
judiciary from existing models of employee management.
The competing principles of independence and accountability have
led this controversial issue to become a current debate in the judiciary.
Any policy that impinges upon the independence of the judiciary must
be proportional to the harm redressed. Such proportionality cannot be
achieved by a ready solution. Continuous deliberation and consultation
are necessary to devise an Internet use policy that adequately balances
judges' concerns of privacy with society's concerns of judicial
efficiency.
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